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1Abstract
This paper poses the following question: Is it possible to improve welfare
by increasing taxes and throwing away the revenues? This paper demonstrates
that the answer to this question is “yes.” We show that there may be welfare
gains from taxing capital income even when the additional capital income tax
revenues are wasted or consumed by a selﬁsh government. Previous literature
has assumed that government expenditures are exogenous or productive, or
allowed for redistribution of tax revenue either via lump-sum transfers, unem-
ployment compensation or other redistributive schemes. In our model a self-
ish government taxes capital above a given threshold and then consumes the
proceeds. This raises the before-tax real return on capital and and thereby en-
hances the ability of agents to self-insure when they are long-term unemployed
and have low savings. Since all agents have positive probability of ﬁnding them-
selves in that state there are cases where all agents prefer a selﬁsh government
to no government at all.1 Introduction
Is it possible to improve welfare by increasing taxes and throwing away the revenues?
This paper demonstrates that the answer to this question is “yes.”
This question arises naturally in the recent literature on the role of self-interested
governments in providing insurance, see in particular Acemoglu-Golosov-Tsyvinski
(2005). These authors show in a model of idiosynchratic productivity risk, that a
direct mechanism implemented by a selﬁsh government can improve welfare over a
laissez-faire market mechanism with no government. In their analysis, agents receive
insurance from the government at the price of paying for its selﬁsh consumption.
Our analysis shows that there are simple competitive mechanisms with a selﬁsh gov-
ernment that Pareto dominate the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium. We provide
intuition and insight into the key mechanisms at work by analyzing two simple bench-
mark cases and then document the quantitative relevance of these eﬀects in a version
of the Bewley-Aiyagari-model with nonlinear capital taxation,
To keep matters simple, we analyze the government from a positive, not a norma-
tive perspective: we directly assume that tax revenues are wasted or - alternatively -
consumed by a selﬁsh government, without directly modeling its preferences. Another
interpretation of our assumption is that are very large frictions in collecting taxes and
spending them. While we ﬁnd any of these interpretations appealing, our focus here
is instead entirely on the implied welfare eﬀects to private agents.
Put diﬀerently, the point of this paper is to illustrate that ruling out insurance
markets for individuals experiencing idiosyncratic shocks opens up some particularly
blatant opportunities to improve welfare. In particular, our paper provides a rationale
for government and taxation that is distinct from the traditional rationale which relies
on the presence of public goods that can only be ﬁnanced with tax revenues.1
We illustrate our point in several steps. In Section 2 we describe some situations
where levying a distortionary tax and throwing away the proceeds does not enhance
welfare. This analysis serves to highlight the roles of complete markets, linear tax
rates and homothetic preferences. We then show that if these assumptions are relaxed,
there is a positive role for a wasteful government. We illustrate using two simple
analytical examples in Section 3.
To ascertain the quantitative relevance of this possibility we conduct some compu-
tational experiments using a Bewley-Aiyagari model in Section 4. More speciﬁcally,
we analyze the welfare eﬀects of an increase in the capital income tax in a model with
borrowing constraints and idiosynchratic, uninsurable income shocks.
Previous work by Chamley(1986), Judd (1985) and Lucas (1990) has shown that
1see e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) for an example where the public good aspect of govern-
ment purchases is modeled.
1all agents will prefer a zero tax rate on capital in the long-run when tax rates are lin-
ear, markets are complete, government purchases are exogenous and the government
is benevolent. Aiyagari (1995) shows that if instead individuals are subject to id-
iosyncratic uninsured risk and borrowing constraints, the optimal tax rate on capital
is positive. This result has found its restatement in the recent work by Golosov and
Tsyvinski (2006) within the context of the new dynamic public ﬁnance literature, see
Kocherlakota (2005) and Golosov, Tsyvinski and Werning (2006).
Our quantitative model departs from the previous literature in three respects.
First, we explicitly compare welfare in an equilibrium where capital taxes are used to
ﬁnance wasteful government purchases with a laissez-faire equilibrium with no gov-
ernment. The previous Ramsey tax literature (examples include Chamley (1986),
Judd (1985) or Aiyagari (1995)), in contrast assumes that there is an exogenously
ﬁxed and positive amount of government purchases that must be ﬁnanced. In that
environment under some relatively weak assumptions described in Section 2, agents
are always better oﬀ if the level of government purchases is reduced towards zero.
Second, we assume markets are incomplete. This assumption introduces the possibil-
ity that a government could improve over a laissez faire competitive equilibrium by
enhancing the set of insurance possibilities. Third, we assume that the capital income
taxation is nonlinear. More speciﬁcally, we assume that a linear tax is levied only on
capital income above some exempt level.
We do not provide a direct-mechanism foundation for this assumption, but it is
likely that such a foundation can be obtained in at least two ways. First, assume that
savings of agents are not observable. Assume furthermore that agents have access
to an unobservable “backyard” technology, employing capital up to some threshold
¯ k, while renting out their additional capital holdings to ﬁrms via the market place.
In that situation, the government can only tax the market payments of ﬁrms to
households for renting capital at its source, and thus can only tax capital income of
households exceeding the threshold. If agents are free to distribute their additional
savings across these ﬁrms, the government might as well choose the tax schedule to
be linear, as in Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006). Second, one might imagine a tax
authority requiring reports of agents not only regarding their productivity level, but
also their savings, and assume, that the tax authority could verify the savings level
at a cost. We conjecture that this environment too could give rise to the type of tax
scheme considered here, but leave this for future research.
The provision of insurance emphasized in the recent dynamic public ﬁnance liter-
ature is key to our results. Even though tax revenues are waste in our computational
examples all agents, including the persistently unemployed, the transitorily unem-
ployed, and the employed, prefer a selﬁsh government that imposes a positive income
tax on capital over no government. The reason is that when the capital tax is in-
2creased, it lowers the stock of capital and thereby raises the before-tax return. As
a result, agents are better able to self-insure when they ﬁnd themselves unemployed
with low levels of savings. This positive eﬀect of higher taxes is balanced against two
negative eﬀects. Higher taxes on capital lower after-tax income of individuals who
save above the threshold. In addition, a higher tax rate on capital is associated with
a lower wage rate for the employed. Still, if agents are suﬃciently likely to eventually
ﬁnd themselves persistently unemployed with low savings, the insurance beneﬁts ex-
ceed the other two costs and all agents in the economy prefer a positive tax rate on
capital.
Our quantitative experiments indicate that this result occurs when the insurance
motive is large. All of our examples have the property that the real return on assets is
negative when there is no government. Moreover, unemployment risk is also large. If
these assumptions are not satisﬁed some agents continue to prefer a positive tax rate
on capital. Other agents, however, prefer no taxes and measures of average welfare
may either rise or fall with the size of the tax rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes conditions
under which there is no role for a selﬁsh government enhance welfare over autarky
by taxing and consuming the proceeds. Section 3 uses two examples to show that if
these conditions are relaxed that there is a role for a selﬁsh government to tax and
consume. Section 4 describes our quantitative model, Section 5 reports results from
a set of computational experiments and Section 6 contains our concluding remarks.
2 No eﬀect in some benchmark cases
Before analyzing economies in which welfare can be improved by introducing a gov-
ernment that taxes and consumes the proceeds it is useful to ﬁrst describe conditions
under which this cannot happen. First we show that if the equilibrium is Pareto-
optimal, the result will not obtain. Then we demonstrate the importance of the price
channel: if prices are ﬁxed, this channel is shutdown and again, the eﬀect can not
take place. Finally, we show in that starting from a second-best case with complete
markets, linear taxes on capital income, heterogenous endowments of capital and
preferences that satisfy a regularity condition, a tax increase will not increase welfare
if the proceeds are thrown away.
The ﬁrst two claims above are truly trivial. We state them nonetheless for the
sake of clarity and completeness. We assume the usual Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie
framework, which needs no restating here.
Proposition 1 In a Pareto optimal equilibrium, any tax increase cannot result in a
Pareto-improvement. In particular, in an equilibrium of an economy, in which the
3ﬁrst welfare theorem holds, any tax increase which improves the welfare of some agent
must decrease the welfare of another agent
Proof: This is a tautology: there is nothing to prove. •
This proposition says, that to generate the eﬀect one must either consider an envi-
ronment where markets are incomplete or start from an allocation that is not Pareto
optimal. For instance, if the initial situation is one where there are distortionary
taxes than the initial allocation will typically not be Pareto optimal and there is a
possibility that increasing a tax and thowing away the proceeds can improve welfare.
If all agents are identical, and attention is restricted to symmetric allocations and
supporting price systems that satisfy the ﬁrst welfare theorem then a tax increase
can make no agent better oﬀ.
Proposition 2 Consider the decision problem of an agent under ﬁxed, nonnegative
prices. Assume that the agent has completely ordered preferences, that there is free
disposal, and that there are no consumption externalities, i.e. that his (or her) utility
does not depend on the consumption of some goods by some other agent.2 Then a tax
increase cannot make the agent better oﬀ.
Proof: Using revealed preferences, this is a trivial consequence of the fact that
a tax increase reduces the budget set. •
This proposition indicates that the endogenous response of prices to a tax change
is crucial if one is to ﬁnd situations where welfare can be improved by increasing a
tax and throwing the proceeds. If the price channel is shut down then the result will
not occur.
To show the third claim about the impossibility of an improvement in expected
utility due to a wasted tax increase if taxes are linear and preferences are homothetic,
we provide an example rather than a general result. Consider the following model.
Suppose that households are identical and solve the following optimization problem:
maxU(c1,c2,1 − n) (2.1)
s.t.
2Admittedly, these are superﬂuous assumptions as we have already stated that we are in the
usual Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie framework. These assumptions are added here for emphasis, since
the proposition ceases to hold, if they are violated.
4(1 + τc)pc1 + pc2 ≤ (1 − τn)wn (2.2)
where households choose the combination of the two consumption goods and work
eﬀort that maximizes their utility given prices and tax rates. We assume that utility is
strictly increasing in each of its three arguments. A typical competitive ﬁrm chooses
its labor input to solve:
maxpzn − wn. (2.3)
The feasibility constraint for this economy is:
c1 + c2 ≤ zn (2.4)
where z is an index of the productivity of labor input. Finally, note that given the
structure of this problem taxation has no productive role.
Given taxes τc and τn, a competitive equilibrium for this economy is an allocation
(c∗
1,c∗
2,n∗) and a set of prices (p∗,w∗) that
1. is feasible
2. solves the household’s problem given values of τc and τn
3. solves the ﬁrm’s problem.
In this economy, it is straightforward to show that an increase in either of the tax
rates cannot improve welfare. To do this, consider the following (myopic) planner’s
problem:
maxU(c1,c2,1 − n) (2.5)
s.t.
(1 + τc)c1 + c2 ≤ (1 − τn)zn. (2.6)
Notice ﬁrst, that given taxes τc and τn, the allocations from this planners problem
can be supported as a competitive equilibrium for the economy described above with
the prices p = 1 and w = z, and vice versa.
Notice next that any increase in τc or τn reduces the resources available to the
planner and thus, reduces consumption much as in the proof of Proposition 2. From
this we see that it is not feasible to improve the welfare of identical households by
increasing a tax on either consumption or labor and throwing away the proceeds.
We will see in the next section that if we allow households to be diﬀerent and
producer prices to adjust to changes in tax rates as they do in general equilibrium
5that there are nontrivial interactions between heterogeneity and price eﬀects and it
becomes possible to improve welfare for at least some agents by levying taxes and
throwing away or consuming the proceeds.
3 Two simple examples
We now provide two examples in which a tax increase improves utility for some of
the agents even though the proceeds are thrown out. These examples are deliberately
simple so that it is straightforward to see the economic mechanisms that produce our
result.
The ﬁrst example shows how relaxing homotheticity of preferences can give rise
to welfare-increases due to wasted tax increases. The second example shows how a
nonlinear tax schedule can improve welfare, even if the tax proceeds are thrown away.
3.1 Example 1: Bread or Steak
This section considers a very simple example that demonstrates the theoretical pos-
sibility that increasing a tax and throwing away the proceeds can improve welfare of
some of the agents. The key here is non-homotheticity of preferences.
There are n+1 agents. Only one of these n agents is rich. Poor agents receive an
endowment Wp in some numeraire, whereas the rich agent receives the endowment
Wr. Agents have a choice between eating bread (B) or steak (S). They care greatly
about reaching a certain satisfactory level (L) of calory intake, but otherwise prefer
to eat steak rather than bread. We formalize this by assuming that agents maximize
u(B,S) = v(αmin{B + S;L} + (1 − α)S) (3.1)
s.t.
pBB + (1 + τ)pSS = W,
over choices B ≥ 0, S ≥ 0 for some increasing and concave function v(·). Here, α
measures the relative importance of reaching the level of calory intake L, pB and pS
are the prices of bread and steak in terms of the numeraire, τ is the consumption
tax on steak and W = Wr or W = Wp is the endowment of the agent. We restrict
attention to equilibria in which bread is suﬃciently cheap, pB < α(1+τ)pS, the poor
are suﬃciently poor, Wp < pBL, and the rich suﬃciently rich, Wr > (1 + τ)pSL, so
that the poor agents only consume bread and the rich agent only consumes steak.
To produce steak or bread, grain is needed of which there is a total quantity G.
The production function is assumed to be linear: one unit of grain can be turned into
6one unit of bread or into γ units of steak. The technology is operated by a perfectly
competitive sector of price-taking and proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms. These ﬁrms solve:
max
B≥0,S≥0
pBnB + pSS (3.2)
s.t.
nB + S/γ = G.
Restricting attention to equilibria with interior solutions, it follows that γpS = pB.
We assume that γ < α, justifying our prior restriction above to equilibria with pB <
α(1 + τ)pS for positive tax rates, τ ≥ 0. Market clearing requires that the demand
for bread and steak equals supply. The government receives the tax revenues and is
assumed to simply throw them away.
What happens as taxes τ are increased from zero to some positive amount? To




















demonstrating that the bread consumption of the poor increases with increasing taxes.
On the other hand, welfare for the rich agent declines. With enough curvature on
v, and a large enough gap between the endowments of the poor and the rich, overall
welfare would increase too for a large range of welfare weights.
It is also interesting to note that if agents are allowed to agree on the tax rate τ
before they observe their type, all agents will choose a positive tax rate rather than
zero. The reason is clear intuitively: such a tax results in decreased demand for grain,
since the rich agent can no longer aﬀord to sustain the zero-tax steak consumption.
This decrease in the demand for grain lowers the price of bread in terms of the
numeraire, which beneﬁts the poor.
The example above is partial-equilibrium in nature: for example, the ownership
of grain is not stated. The mechanism of the example has a general equilibrium
ﬂavour, however: the poor are made better oﬀ via price changes in highly interdepen-
dent markets. The argument depends critically on stating endowments in terms of a
numeraire, and assuming these endowments are constant under tax changes. If the
model were restated instead, so that the endowment was constant in units of grain,
the tax increase would reduce welfare: the bread consumption of the poor would not
change, and the steak consumption of the rich would fall. Thus, in evaluating policies
of this type in general, the income source matters greatly.
7The preference structure is also important. If, for instance, preferences were ho-
mothetic in bread and steak then the expenditure share of each of these goods would
be constant as income was varied and the result would disappear.
Finally, it should be noted that the fraction of poor and rich is exogenous in this
example as well as the other two examples in this section. Thus, only a fraction of
agents beneﬁts from a selﬁsh government. When we consider the Aiyagari-Bewley
model in Sections 4 and 5 the fraction of each type is endogenous and a given indi-
vidual will ﬁnd himself in diﬀerent situations at various points of time.
3.2 Example 2: Capital and Labor
As pointed out in the “bread versus steak” example in Section 3.1 above, the source
of income matters. We therefore reinvestigate the issue of capital income taxation.
The key in this example will be a nonlinear tax schedule. To keep things simple, we
assume that rich agents are subject to a diﬀerent capital income tax rate than poor
agents.
We will assume that poor as well as rich agents are each endowed with one unit of
time per period, which they supply inelastically as labor. Thus, their income in the
second period is wage income, which in turn is tied to the level of the capital stock: if
the capital stock is low, wages will be too, which, ceteris paribus, will hurt the poor
agent. With these two opposing forces - the rise in the interest rate versus the fall
in wages - at work, is it still possible to construct an example in which the rise in τ
improves welfare for the poor? The purpose of this section is to show that this can
indeed occur, and oﬀer a prelude to the computational example of Section 4.
We make some more detailed functional form assumptions. Each agent is endowed
with one unit of time per period, which he or she supplies inelastically as labor.







where K is capital (“machines”) and L is labor. The initial capital stock per agent
is assumed to be K1 = ¯ K and is owned entirely by the rich agent. Capital does not
depreciate. Output and old capital can be used for consumption and new capital,
1
n + 1
(nC1,p + C1,r) + K2 = Y1 + K1, (3.6)
where Yt = K
ρ
t /ρ is the per capita output in period t. Capital per capita in period 2




(nSp + Sr), (3.7)
8where Sp is the saving of a poor agent and Sr is the saving of the rich agent. The












C2,r = W1 +
1
(1 − τ)d
W2 + (n + 1)
 
ρY1 + ¯ K

. (3.9)
Wages Wt and the dividend on capital d are given, as usual, by
Wt = (1 − ρ)Yt (3.10)
d = ρY2/K2 (3.11)
We restrict attention to equilibria which permit an interior solution to the savings
problem of the rich agent, so that (1 − τ)d = 1. This implies that the second period
capital stock is
K2 = (1 − τ)
(1/(1−ρ)) (3.12)






The poor agent will only consume in period 2, i.e. C1,p = 0 and








+ (1 − τ)
(ρ/(1−ρ))
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To evaluate, whether a poor agent (and thus every agent ex ante) would favour an
increase in τ, starting from τ = 0, evaluate the derivate of the right hand side of

















In that case, the positive interest rate eﬀect (dW1) outweighs the negative second-
period wage eﬀect (W2).
9To close the model, we need to verify that consumption is positive in both periods
for the rich agent, as we have assumed. To that end, we make the following additional
assumptions. We assume that ρ = 1/2− for some small but nonzero  > 0, and that
¯ K = 1, so that the inequality above is satisﬁed, i.e. so that the poor agents are in
favour of a tax increase. Their savings Sp = W1 satisfy Sp < 1+5, if  is suﬃciently
small, so that the savings of the rich agent at τ = 0 is
Sr = (n + 1)K2 − nSp > 1 − 5n. (3.17)
If  is suﬃcently small, Sr is positive. Since Sr is smaller than (n + 1), the initial
capital endowment of the rich agent, it follows that the consumption of the rich is
indeed positive in both periods.
Thus, here too a tax increase whose proceeds are thrown away improves welfare
for the poor. One can use other values for ρ as well, as long as the initial capital
stock is chosen “just right”: otherwise, the consumption of the rich according to the
calculations above becomes negative, which is inadmissable.
4 A Bewley-Aiyagari-model with nonlinear capital
income taxation.
We next turn to provide a more elaborate computational example that illustrates that
increasing the capital income tax and throwing away the proceeds can also enhance
welfare in a quantitative model. More speciﬁcally, we examine the welfare eﬀects
of a nonlinear capital income taxation scheme in the context of an inﬁnite horizon
economy with idiosyncratic risk. We have two speciﬁc rationales for considering a
quantitative model. First, it allows us to relax the assumption that agent types are
exogenous and thereby opens the door to the possibility that all agents might prefer
a selﬁsh government over no government. Second, we are interested in understanding
our theoretical result is quantitatively relevant.
The rationale for investigating a nonlinear tax scheme is based on the results of
Section 2. As shown in Section 2 in a simple example, if the tax schedule on capital is
linear increasing the tax rate reduces resources everywhere in a quasi-social planners
problem, and therefore also reduces welfare. This coincides with numerical results
obtainable here: without an exemption in the capital income tax rate, none of our
quantitative examples provide higher welfare over a laissez-faire equillibrium with no
government.
The welfare analysis reported here is performed by investigating steady state re-
sults, rather than considering transitions to the steady state. We do this to faciliate
comparisions with the previous literature which has focused on the combined eﬀects
of taxation and distribution.
10Time is discrete, t = 1,2,.... There is a continuum of agents i ∈ [0;1] , who live












Agents may be in one of three states. They can either be employed (s = 3,ni,t = 1),
short-term unemployed (s = 2,ni,t = 0) or long-term unemployed (s = 1,ni,t =
0), where we denote the status of employment by ni,t ∈ {0;1}. The state evolves
according to a three-state stationary Markov process, which is assumed to be identical,
but independent across agents. The transition from state s ∈ {1;2;3} to s0 ∈ {1;2;3}
is described by probabilities πs,s0.
If agents are employed, they work and receive an aftertax wage wt in terms of
period-t consumption. Agents hold capital ki,t, where ki,0 is the initial endowment of
agent i. They rent capital out to ﬁrms, for which they receive a rental rate of dt per
unit of capital before taxes and depreciation. Capital depreciates at an exogeneously
given rate δ. The consumption good in period t can also be used for investing in the
capital good: negative investments (“resales”) are permitted. Thus, the before-tax
return (“one plus the interest rate”) on capital is
Rt = dt + 1 − δ (4.2)
per unit of capital. Capital income is subject to taxes, labor income is assumed to
be assessed on an aftertax basis. Since our primary focus is on the eﬀects of capital
taxation we hold the labor tax ﬁxed throughout our analysis.
The tax function for capital is given by τ(·,·). The after-tax return ρi,t per unit
of capital realized by agent i at time t depends on the amount of capital held by the
agent and on the market return via
ρi,tki,t−1 = Rtki,t−1 − τ(Rt,ki,t−1). (4.3)
There are no asset markets other than capital. In particular, there is no insurance
against the idiosynchratic shocks arising from the Markov process for the employment
status. Thus, agent i maximizes the utility function (4.1), subject to the initial
conditions ni,1 and ki,0 and subject to the period-by-period budget constraints
ci,t + ki,t = wtni,t + Rtki,t−1 − τ(Rt,ki,t−1). (4.4)
with ki,t ≥ 0.3
There is a competitive sector of ﬁrms, which hires labor and rents capital to
produce output with a linearly homogenous production function. Firms solve
max
k,n
y(k,n) − dtk − wtn (4.5)
3We are imposing an ad hoc borrowing constraint here that rules out un-collateralized borrowing.
11where output is produced using a Cobb-Douglas production function y = Akαn1−α.
As usual, proﬁts will be zero in equilibrium.
There is a government, which chooses the tax function τ. The government is
assumed to waste these tax revenues or, equivalently, to consume them: agents neither
receive transfers from the government nor does government consumption enter their
utility function.
Let Gt denote total government consumption or, equivalently, the total wasted
tax revenue.
Take a particular tax function τ(·,·) as given. An equilibrium consists of stochastic
sequences ((ci,t,ki,t,ni,t,ρi,t)i,t,wt,dt,Rt), that solve the maximization problem of the














Kt + Ct + Gt = Yt + (1 − δ)Kt−1, (4.9)
where Yt = AKα
t−1N
1−α
t is aggregate production.
To do the welfare comparison, it is desirable to make all agents identical ini-
tially, i.e. to give them the same initial capital and employment status, and to then
consider the dynamic adjustment path of the economy. This turns out to be hard
numerically and makes comparisons with the previous literature more diﬃcult. We
have thus chosen the easier route of only comparing steady states and calculating av-
erage welfare: the usual caveats apply. To do the calculations, we alternate between
two phases of computation. In phase 1, we iterate on Bellman’s equation to calculate
household decision rules, given dividends and the wage. In phase 2, we iterate on
the steady state capital-employment distribution, exploiting ergodicity, given the de-
cision rules. Alternating between these two phases of calculations usually resulted in
convergence to an equilibrium. As the equilibrium must be characterized by βR < 1,
as Huggett (1995) has shown, it follows that the steady state distribution for capital
has compact (i.e. bounded) support. The numerical method is in many ways similar
to the approach used in Uhlig (1990) or Aiyagari (1994, 1995).
4The integrals here are Pettis integrals, see Uhlig (1996), i.e. we employ the law of large numbers.
125 Results
The model parameters are set so that the capital share, α = 0.30, the discount factor
β = 0.96, the depreciation rate δ = {0.15,0.7} and the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion of η = {1,2,5}. The Markov transition matrix for the three states of long-



















We discretize the state-space when solving Bellman’s equation. The minimum capital
holding is set to 0.0001 and a minimum consumption level of 0.001 is assumed.
We provide three sets of simulation results that vary the risk aversion parameter
η. We will see that all of our examples require a negative real return on assets when
there is no government. This is accomplished by varying the depreciation rate on
capital. The choice of the Markov process implies that there is a state with persistent
unemployment. We view this as a simple way to proxy for e.g. retirement or disability
in an inﬁnite horizon model.
We ﬁrst considered the case where capital income is taxed linearly, i.e. where
τ(R,k) = (1 − ¯ τ)Rk. (5.3)
In this case, no agent beneﬁts from the tax increase, because the after-tax return is
lower for everybody.
Next we considered a more general speciﬁcation of the capital tax schedule by
allowing for an exemption:
τ(R,k) = ¯ τRmax{k − ¯ k;0} (5.4)
where ¯ τ is the marginal tax rate on capital above the exempt amount ¯ k. The German
tax code turns out to have roughly this structure, with the exemption amount to
12200 DM (approx 9000 $) for a married couple. Also, in the US, there are indirect
provisions of that sort, since capital income due to the appreciation of a home is tax
free once in a tax payers life. This tax schedule can, more generally, be thought of as
a parsimonious way of capturing progressivity in the tax code.
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Figure 1: This ﬁgure shows how pre-tax dividends and wages vary with the tax rate ¯ τ.
Note, however, that our tax rates are applied to the entire return R = d + 1 − δ
on capital and not just to the capital gain d − δ. The reason for this choice is that
we are interested in a region of the parameter space where d− δ < 0. Consider ﬁrst
the results for the case where η = 2. This simulation also assumes a value of δ = 0.15
and that the ﬁrst unit of capital is exempt from taxation.
Figure 1 reports values of the before tax real return on capital and the wage for
alternative values of the tax rate on capital. From this ﬁgure we can see that the
before tax return on capital rises monotonically with the tax rate while the wage rate
falls monotonically. Note also, that at low levels of the tax rate the before tax return
on capital is negative. In the various simulations we have run, we have found that this
feature is important in producing a welfare enhancing role for a selﬁsh government.
Households not only face idiosyncratic risk but their ability to self-insure is limited
due to the fact that the real value of their assets declines over time. Figure 2
shows how after-tax capital income varies with holdings of the capital stock at three























Figure 2: This ﬁgure shows how the pattern of after-tax capital income changes as the tax
rate is increased when there is an exemption on taxation below a threshold.
15alternative tax rates. When the tax rate on capital income is zero capital income rises
linearly with holdings of capital. As the tax rate is increased capital income increases
at a faster rate for holdings of capital that are below the exemption threshold. Then
the slope becomes much ﬂatter at levels of capital income above the threshold. This
eﬀect becomes more pronounced as the tax rate is increased from 0.28 to 0.58. From
this we see that the general equilibrium eﬀect of the higher tax rate on the before tax
return on capital acts to increase capital income for households with low holdings of
capital. This mechanism acts as insurance for households when they ﬁnd themselves
persistently unemployed and thus have no labor income and their savings are run
down. However, it is not clear at all that this policy is welfare enhancing. When
households are employed and have high holdings of capital this policy lowers both
their wages and their capital income. Indeed, if households are employed most of the
time one might expect this latter eﬀect to dominate the former eﬀect.
Figure 3 indicates that the value of the insurance is substantial in this computa-
tional example.
Figure 3 reports the overall welfare eﬀect in terms of expected welfare and welfare
for each of the three employment states. It should be emphasized that the plots of each
state are averages across all holdings of capital. This ﬁgure makes very clear that the
biggest beneﬁciaries of a higher tax rate on capital are the long-term unemployed. The
largest beneﬁts occur when the tax rate ranges between 0 and 0.2. It can also be seen
from this ﬁgure that average welfare is also increasing for short-term unemployed and
employed households too. Even though average welfare increases for both employed
and unemployed there may be some individuals who prefer no government. This is, in
fact, the case in the baseline simulation. For values of the tax rate that are less than
4 percent some agents prefer no taxes. We summarize this property of the simulation
in Table 1. When the tax rate reaches 4 percent, as reported in the upper panel of the
table, welfare is higher for individuals in all states that receive positive probability in
the ergodic distribution. The before tax real return on capital is -0.08 percent and
the fraction of output this is consumed by the government is 13 percent. At tax rates
above this level welfare is increasing for all agents. The upper limit on the gains to
a selﬁsh government occur when government revenue is maximized. This is reported
in the lower panel of Table 1, government revenue is maximized when the tax rate is
10 percent. This produces a share of output of 19 percent. Consumption’s share of
output is 0.33.
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Figure 3: This ﬁgure shows the change in average welfare when capital income taxes are
increased. The overall eﬀect is divided into the three components: the welfare gain for long-
term unemployed agents, short-term unemployed agents and the welfare gain for employed
agents.
17Parameters
Risk aversion coefficient (η) 1 2 5
depreciation rate (δ) 0.7 0.15 0.15
amount of capital subject to tax 
exemption  0.1 1 1
Lowest capital tax rate that produces 
higher welfare than laissez-faire 0.22 0.04 0.1
Fraction of output that is wasted 0.048 0.13 0.33
before tax rental rate on capital 0.775 0.072 0.071
 level of the capital stock 0.205 6.04 6.25
consumption share of output 0.68 0.25 0.033
output 0.53 1.459 1.474
Revenue maximizing capital tax rate 0.28 0.1 0.48
Fraction of output that is wasted 0.055 0.19 0.63
before tax rental rate on capital 0.82 0.0989 0.136
level of the capital stock 0.19 3.88 2.437
consumption share of output 0.69 0.3263 0.037
output 0.52 1.2778 1.11
Three parameterizations where the presence of a selfish government provides higher 
welfare for all agents than laissez-faire (no government).
Table 1
Table 1 also reports results for two other parameterizations of the model. The
right most column contains results for a scenario with higher risk aversion η = 5. For
tax rates that range between 0 and 10 percent some but not all agents are better oﬀ.
However, for tax rates in excess of 10 percent, all agents are better oﬀ than laissez-
faire. Note also that the fraction of output consumed by the government is larger
here it ranges from 0.33 to 0.63 and consumptions share of output is very small.
The left-most column of Figure 1 reports results for log preferences. If the depreci-
ation rate is left at 0.15 then there are always a positive measure of agents who prefer
laissez-faire over a positive tax rate on capital. However, if the real return on capital
is driven negative by increasing the depreciation rate on capital we ﬁnd that there are
scenarios where all agents prefer a positive tax rate on capital. The key is once again
a negative return on capital. Here the range of tax rates that improves welfare and
also lies in the increasing portion of the Laﬀer curve is narrow. The income tax rate
must lie between 22 and 28 percent. The fraction of output that is wasted though is
less than 6 percent and well within the range of estimates of corruption in emerging
economies. In addition, consumption’s share of output is a bit below 0.7 which is also
not wildly at odds with data from emerging economies. The capital output ratio is
18low, only about 0.37 and the before tax real return on capital is positive and ranges
between 7.5 percent and 12 percent. Overall, this simulation is not is not all that far
from the experiences of some emerging economies.
6 Conclusion
This paper studied the welfare implications of raising the capital income tax on sav-
ings and throwing away the proceeds in an economy with idiosynchratic, uninsurable
income shocks and borrowing constraints. This paper has shown, that introducing
a selﬁsh government that taxes and consumes the revenues can raise welfare of each
type of agent when there is an exemption on the tax for households with low levels
of saving.This is because the wasted tax increase raises the before return on capital
and thereby increases income of poor unemployed households. The computational
examples provided in this paper indicate that this result is most likely to be relevant
in very poor economies where households face negative real returns on their savings
and occasional highly persistent shocks to their earnings due to e.g. disability. The
results also suggest that in economies where property rights are protected and private
insurance markets are well developed individuals will be less tolerant of governments
that tax capital and consume the proceeds.
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